IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
PRESENT
Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi
Ms. Justice Musarrat Hilali
Mr. Justice Shakeel Ahmad
Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024
[Against the judgment dated 01.07.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.P.No. 6032/2020]
Asjad Ullah …Petitioner(s)
Versus
Mst. Asia Bano and others …Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner(s) : Ch. Afrasiab Khan, ASC
a/w petitioner in-person
For the Respondent(s) : N.R.
Date of Hearing : 22.04.2025
JUDGMENT
Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J.- Through this petition, the petitioner
has challenged the judgment dated 01.07.2024 (“Impugned Judgment”)
passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore (“the High Court”) whereby the
constitutional petition (W.P.No.6032/2020) filed by petitioner was dismissed.

  1. Brief facts of the case are that the marriage between the
    petitioner and respondent No.1 was solemnized on 18.03.2012. Out of
    the said wedlock, one daughter, namely Abiha Zainab (minor), was born
    on 20.12.2012, who is presently residing in the custody of respondent
    No.1 (mother of the minor). Thereafter, the petitioner pronounced divorce
    upon respondent No.1 on 10.11.2015. At the time of pronouncement of
    divorce, the petitioner was residing in Greece. Subsequently, the
    petitioner filed an application (Application No.18/2018 dated 10.04.2018) under
    Section 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (“the Act”), seeking
    custody of the minor before the Court of Ms. Sobia Shahnawaz, Judge
    Family Court/Guardian Judge, Gujrat (“Trial Court”). It is pertinent to
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 2
    observe that the application for custody was filed after a lapse of more
    than five years from the birth of the minor. During this entire period, the
    petitioner neither made any effort to seek visitation rights nor even
    attempted to meet the minor. The learned Trial Court, after recording the
    evidence of both parties and providing them ample opportunity of
    hearing, dismissed the said application by an order dated 19.10.2019.
    However, the learned Trial Court, while doing so, fixed a visitation
    schedule, allowing the petitioner to meet the minor during his visits to
    Pakistan. Even though the petitioner neither filed an application under
    Section 12 of the Act nor sought any specific relief for visitation in his
    custody application.
  2. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the learned trial
    Court, the petitioner preferred Guardian Appeal No.172/2019 before the
    Court of Saima Husnain, Additional District Judge, Gujrat (“Appellate
    Court”), however, the findings of the trial Court were upheld and the
    appeal was dismissed vide judgment dated 20.11.2019. Thereafter, the
    petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the High Court, which also
    met with the fate of dismissal through the impugned judgment. Hence,
    the present petition.
  3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the
    impugned judgments and orders concurrently passed by the learned
    courts below are illegal, unjustified, and in violation of the injunctions of
    Islam; that respondent No.1 has contracted a second marriage with one
    Faisal Munir, who is a complete stranger to the minor daughter of the
    petitioner; that the petitioner, being the natural guardian, has a vested
    right to claim custody (Hizanat), particularly as the minor has attained
    the age of 12 years, therefore, prays that impugned judgment may be set
    aside.
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 3
  4. We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned
    counsel for the petitioner and perused the material available on record.
  5. The central issue raised in this petition is whether a father,
    who has never met his minor daughter and resides abroad since her birth,
    can claim custody of minor on the sole ground of being natural guardian
    when natural mother of minor has contracted a second marriage?
  6. Section 25 of the Act deals with the matters of custody of
    minors and is reproduced below:-
    “‘25. Title of guardian to custody of ward.— (1) If a ward leaves or
    is removed from the custody of a guardian of his person, the
    Court, if it is of opinion that it will be for the welfare of the ward
    to return to the custody of his guardian, may make an order for
    his return, and for the purpose of enforcing the order may cause
    the ward to be arrested and to be delivered into the custody of the
    guardian.”
    In the same vein, the determination of custody of a minor is also
    governed by Section 17 of the Act, which provides as follows:
    “17. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing
    guardian.—
    (1) In appointing or declaring the guardian of the minor, the
    Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be guided by
    what, consistently with the law to which the minor is subject,
    appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor.
    (2). In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor the
    Court shall have regard to the age, sex and religion of the minor,
    the character and capacity of the proposed guardian and his
    nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a deceased
    parent, and any existing or previous relations of the proposed
    guardian with the minor or his property.
    (3). If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference,
    the Court may consider that preference.”
    Bare perusal of Section 17 of the Act reveals that, in determining the
    appointment of a guardian for a minor, the courts must primarily take
    into consideration the welfare of the minor.
  7. It is a settled principle of law that the welfare and best
    interests of the minor(s) shall be the prime and overriding consideration
    in determining an application for custody, with no other factor taking
    precedence as noted by this Court in the case of Khan Muhammad v. Mst.
    Surayya Bibi and others (2008 SCMR 480). Now determination that what
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 4
    constitutes welfare of a minor is a question of fact that must be
    established through cogent and reliable evidence in each case rather
    than presumptions as observed earlier by this Court in the case of
    Rahimullah Choudhary v.Mrs. Sayeda Helali Begum and others (1974
    SCMR 305).
  8. The expression “welfare of the minor” includes the minor’s
    moral, spiritual, physical, psychological, educational, and material wellbeing. It further encompasses considerations relating to the minor’s
    health, academic progress, religious upbringing, and overall emotional
    development. In determining welfare, due weight must also be given to
    the minor’s happiness and emotional attachment to the proposed
    custodian. Reference may be made to the case of Feroze Begum
    v.Muhammad Hussain (1978 SCMR 299) wherein it has been held that:-
    “8. The question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to
    whether it would be at all in the welfare of the minors to up‑root
    the two students from their respective local Government schools
    in which they are studying in the hope that they shall do better in
    a more promising institution away from their home town. This
    question has escaped the attention of the trial Court as well as
    the High Court and has remained unanswered in their impugned
    orders.
    Under the Shariat Law, the mother is entitled to the custody
    (hizanat) of her male child until he has completed the age of seven
    years and of her female child until she has attained puberty. The
    ‑right continues though she is divorced by the father of the child.
    Needless to mention here that the father is the natural guardian
    of his minor children and the mother’s custody is a subordinate,
    custody and is subject to the control of the father. But the mere
    inability to maintain the children is not a ground for depriving the
    mother of the custody of her children. In Harbai v. Usman (P L D
    1963 Kar. 88 ) it ‘ was held that mother’s poverty is no hindrance
    to the custody of her minor daughter. Indeed in law it is for the
    father to provide for their maintenance.

    The welfare of a minor means his material, intellectual, moral and
    spiritual well‑being. The High Court accepted the offer made by
    the respondent herein in putting the two minors in a good school
    at Rawalpindi or at Murree as boarders. But, in doing so, it did
    not even consider whether or not it would be at all advisable for
    Mst. Sajida minor, who is about to, attain puberty, to admit her
    in a hostel away from her parents.”
    [Emphasis supplied]
    Thus, while determining the welfare of the minor, the Court shall take
    into account the age, sex, religion, and other relevant circumstances of
    the minor, the character and capacity of the proposed guardian, as well
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 5
    as the preference of the minor, provided the minor is of sufficient
    maturity to express an intelligent preference.
  9. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that the welfare of the
    minor is of paramount concern, and that the actions of the litigating
    parties are not motivated by personal vendettas, vanity, or emotional
    desires for affection, but solely in the best interest of the minor. In
    matters concerning the custody of a child, the Family Court is not
    obliged to delve into the intricacies or technicalities of the case but must
    focus on determining what is in the best interest of the minor. Reference
    may be made to the case of Mehmood Akhtar v. District Judge, Attock and
    2 others (2004 SCMR 1839) wherein this Court has categorically held
    that:-
    “4. The right of custody of minor is not an absolute right rather it
    is always subject to the welfare of the minor. The Court in the
    light of law, on the subject and facts and circumstances of each
    case considers the question of custody on the basis of welfare of
    minors and there can be no deviation to the settled principle of
    law that in the matter of custody of minor the paramount
    consideration is always the welfare of minor. No doubt general
    principle of Muhammadan Law is that a Muslim father being the
    natural guardian of the minor, has the preferential right of
    custody of minor but this rule is always subject to the welfare of
    the minor which is the prime consideration in determination of
    the question of custody….”
    [Emphasis added]
  10. Under Islamic law, the father is generally entitled to custody
    of a boy after the age of seven years and of a girl after puberty. This
    Court, however, in the case of Tahira v. Additional District Judge,
    Rawalpindi and others (1990 SCMR 852) has categorically held that this
    entitlement is subject to the overriding consideration of the minor’s
    welfare. Even where custody would otherwise shift to the father upon
    attainment of the prescribed age, the Court may refuse custody if the
    welfare of the minor so demands. It was further observed that in case of
    any conflict between the rights of the parents and the welfare of the
    minor, the welfare of the minor shall prevail. The Court is not bound by
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 6
    any agreement between the parents if it is contrary to the interests of the
    minor.
  11. The concept of the welfare of the child is internationally
    recognized as being embodied in the principle of the “best interests of the
    child.” This principle, affirmed under Article 3(1) of the United Nations
    Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (“UNCRC”) serves as a
    paramount consideration in all actions concerning children, whether
    undertaken by public or private institutions, courts of law, or
    administrative authorities.
  12. Even internationally, it is a well-established principle among
    all civilized nations that children possess rights by virtue of being
    children. These obligations are of an erga omnes character and have been
    codified in the UNCRC. The UNCRC constitutes an international treaty
    that sets forth the rights guaranteed to children. The Islamic Republic of
    Pakistan ratified the UNCRC on 12.11.1990, initially subject to a
    reservation that its provisions would be interpreted in the light of Islamic
    injunctions. However, said reservation was withdrawn in 1997, thereby
    rendering Pakistan’s ratification absolute and unconditional. Article 27 of
    the UNCRC is reproduced below:_
  13. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of
    living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral
    and social development.
  14. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the
    primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and
    financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the
    child’s development.
  15. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and
    within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist
    parents and others responsible for the child to implement this
    right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and
    support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition,
    clothing and housing.”
    Said Article must be read with Article 3 paragraph 1 of the UNCRC,
    which reads as under;
    “1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
    public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
    administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
    of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 7
  16. The concept of the “child’s best interests” is not novel.
    Indeed, it pre-dates the UNCRC and was already enshrined in the 1959
    Declaration of the Rights of the Child,1 the Convention on the
    Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979,2 as
    well as in regional instruments and many national and international
    laws.3 In assessing and determining the best interests of the child, the
    State is under an obligation to ensure the provision of such protection
    and care as is necessary for the child’s well-being.4 The term “wellbeing,” when interpreted broadly, encompasses the child’s fundamental
    material, physical, educational, and emotional needs, in addition to
    his/her requirements for affection and security.5
  17. With regard to the contention raised by the learned counsel
    for the petitioner that the father, being the natural guardian, is entitled
    to the custody of the minor, it is correct that the petitioner is indeed the
    natural guardian of the minor. However, the law draws a clear distinction
    between the concepts of custody and guardianship and the respective
    rights and obligations arising therefrom under the Act. The definition of
    “guardian” as provided under Section 4(2) of the Act appears to
    encompass the concept of custody, unless custody has been exclusively
    awarded by the Court to a party other than the natural guardian.
    Custody, within the meaning of the Act, primarily involves the right to
    the upbringing of the minor, whereas guardianship entails an
    overarching responsibility for the welfare of the minor, including in
    situations where the guardian does not have actual physical possession

1 Declaration of Rights of Child, 1959, para.2.
2 Article 5(b) and 16(1)(d).
3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 14 (2013) on
the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration
(art. 3, para. 1), 29 May 2013, CRC /C/GC/14, para.2.
4 UN Convention on Rights of Children, 1969, Article 3 para 2.
5 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 14 (2013) on
the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration
(art. 3, para. 1), 29 May 2013, CRC /C/GC/14,para 71.
Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 8
of the minor. A father, by virtue of being the natural guardian, remains
obligated to provide financial support for the minor even after separation
from the mother and even when the custody of the minor is granted to
the mother. It is well-settled that the liability of the father to maintain
the minor is not only religious and moral but is also a legal obligation. It
has been consistently held that the right to custody is subordinate to the
paramount consideration of the welfare of the minor. The inability of the
mother to financially maintain the minor cannot, by itself, deprive her of
custody, as the primary duty to provide maintenance rests upon the
father. This principle was affirmed in Mst. Feroze Begum v. Lt.-Col.
Muhammad Hussain (1983 SCMR 606), Munawar Bibi v. Muhammad
Amin and another (1995 SCMR 1206), Mst. Razia Bibi v. Riaz Ahmad
and another (2004 SCMR 821), and further reinforced in Mst. Beena v.
Raja Muhammad and others (PLD 2020 SC 508).

  1. Insofar as the contention of the learned counsel for the
    petitioner that respondent No.1 has contracted a second marriage with a
    person who is a stranger to the minor and, therefore, is not entitled to
    the custody of the minor, it is by now a settled principle of law that the
    mere fact of a mother’s remarriage does not ipso facto disentitle her from
    the custody of the minor.
  2. As per D.F. Mulla’s Principles of Muhammadan Law
    (Paragraphs 352 and 354), a mother’s right of custody continues after
    divorce but may be forfeited upon remarriage, particularly if she marries
    a person not related to the minor within the prohibited degrees. However,
    Section 17 of the Act requires that the welfare of the minor must be of
    the paramount consideration. This Court has consistently held that the
    rules in Muhammadan Law regarding disqualification of a mother upon
    remarriage are not absolute. In Shabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem
    (2014 SCMR 343), it has been affirmed that if the welfare of the minor
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 9
    lies with the mother, custody may be granted to her notwithstanding her
    second marriage.
  3. Therefore, each case must be decided on its own facts, with
    the welfare of the minor remaining the paramount consideration. In
    such cases, if the welfare of the minor is best served by awarding custody
    to the mother, even after remarriage, the court may grant her custody as
    held in the case of Raja Muhammad Owais v. Mst. Nazia Jabeen and
    others (2022 SCMR 2123). This Court, in the case of Mst. Shahista Naz
    v. Muhammad Naeem Ahmed and another (2004 SCMR 990), observed
    that the right of Hizanat having the force of Injunction of Islam is an
    accepted principle of Islamic Law. Moreover a female, on account of remarriage may be disqualified to exercise this right, but a mother on
    account of remarriage is not absolutely disqualified to be entrusted the
    custody of a minor child rather she may lose her preferential right of
    custody.
  4. In the case of Mst. Beena vs. Raja Muhammad and others
    (PLD 2020 SC 508) this Court emphasized the critical importance of the
    mother-child bond, stating that removing a child from the mother
    disrupts their relationship and deprives the child of the love and care
    essential for his/her upbringing. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced
    below:-
    “11. …………… If a child is taken away from the mother, deprived
    of her love and the benefit of her upbringing the mother and the
    child’s relationship is fragmented.
  5. Another of the principles provides that Muslims must be
    enabled to live their lives in accordance with the fundamental
    principles and basic concepts of Islam and to promote unity and
    the observance of the Islamic moral standards. The religion of
    Islam gives a high status to expectant ladies and mothers. When
    performing the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages, Muslims run
    between the mounts of Safa and Marwah (Sa’ee) in the footsteps
    of the lady Haajar to emulate her when she desperately searched
    for water for her child, Ismail (peace be upon him). Haajar the
    esteemed mother is commemorated in perpetuity by incorporating
    her actions as an integral component in the performance of Hajj
    and Umrah of the Islamic Faith. A mother-child bond and a
    mother’s agony instituted a religious obligation, a rare if not the
    only example, in world religions. The mother of Islam’s progeny,
    lady Haajar is buried next to her son, the Prophet Ismail (peace
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 10
    be upon him), in the Hateem, the crescent shaped enclosure
    adjacent to one of the walls of the Holy Ka’ba, also known as Hijr
    Ismail, the shelter constructed by Prophet Ibrahim (peace be
    upon him) for his wife and child. Pilgrims from all over the world
    circumambulate the Holy Ka’ba, including the Hijr/Hateem.
  6. The high status of motherhood is reflected in the naming of a
    chapter of the Holy Qu’ran after Maryam (Mary), peace be upon
    her, the only chapter named after a woman. Almighty Allah
    recalls her qualities and bestows on her a number of titles: a
    purified (tahharaki) and chosen (istafagi) one, a sin (ayatan) of
    God, truthful (siddiqatun) and devoutly obedient (qanitina). The
    lady Maryam (peace be upon her) is mentioned 34 times in the
    Holy Qur’an. The mother of the Prophet Isa (peace be upon him)
    faced the pangs of childbirth alone. She, like the lady Haajar,
    overcame formidable odds to care for her child. These great ladies
    are acknowledged and incorporated into the Faith, enriching
    Islam’s glorious tradition. It is for believers to ponder and reflect
    upon their lives, and to derive lessons from it. To be financially
    underprivileged, to be weighed down with a child, to give birth or
    to have a disability is not something to be derided. For a mother
    to bear the pain of childbirth, the greatest human natural pain,
    but then to have her child wrested away from her on the pretext
    that she is incapable of taking care of the child is insensitive in
    the extreme, and may also be characterized as hypocritical.”
    [Emphasis added]
    Reference may also be made to the case of Shabana Naz v Muhammad
    Saleem (2014 SCMR 343), wherein it has been observed as under:-
    “As regard the second marriage with another woman by
    respondent No.1, it may be noted that this fact alone will not
    disentitle respondent No.1 from obtaining custody of his minor
    daughter. Moreso, when it is an admitted fact that the appellant
    too has remarried another person, namely, Haji Syed Wali with
    whom the minor has no relationship.
    “11. Para 352 of the Muhammadan Law provides the mother is
    entitled to the custody (Hizanat) of her male child until he has
    completed the age of 7 years and of her female child until she has
    attained puberty and the right continues though she is divorced
    by the father of his child unless she marries a second husband in
    which case the custody belongs to the father.
    “12. Para 354 provides for disqualification of female from custody
    of the minor, which includes the mother and one of the instance
    laid down is that if she marries a person not related to the child
    within the prohibited degree e.g. a stranger but the right revives
    on the dissolution of marriage by death or divorce.
    “13. Thus, it is apparent from reading of the two paras of the
    Muhammadan Law that though the mother is entitled to the
    custody (Hizanat) of her minor child but such right discontinues
    when she takes second husband, who is not related to the child
    within the prohibited degree and is a stranger in which case the
    custody of minor child belongs to the father. It has been
    construed by the Courts in Pakistan that this may not be an
    absolute rule but it may be departed from, if there are exceptional
    circumstances to justify such departure and in making of such
    departure the only fact, which the Court has to see where the
    welfare of minor lies and there may be a situation where despite
    second marriage of the mother, the welfare of minor may still lie
    in her custody.
    [Emphasis added]
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 11
  7. While it has been settled that a mother’s second marriage,
    even to a person stranger to minor, does not in itself disqualify her from
    custody of the minor, provided that the welfare of the minor is best
    served by her continued care. It is significant to note that the petitioner
    himself has contracted a second marriage and is residing abroad.
    Furthermore, upon a specific query posed by this Court during the
    course of arguments regarding the frequency of his visits to Pakistan, the
    petitioner admitted that he visited Pakistan only after a lapse of four
    years and, even then, did not file any application seeking visitation rights
    in respect of the minor. This conduct further reflects the petitioner’s lack
    of genuine interest in the welfare and upbringing of the minor. It is
    further an undisputed fact that the petitioner has no surviving parents.
    Considering that the petitioner is residing abroad and has contracted a
    second marriage, it raises serious concerns as to who would assume
    responsibility for the minor’s day-to-day care, supervision, and emotional
    needs in his absence. This Court in the case of Mst. Firdous Iqbal v.
    Shifaat Ali and others (2000 SCMR 838) has noted that:-
    ” 15. … It would, thus, be noticed that right of the father to claim
    the custody of a minor son is not an absolute right, in that, the
    father may disentitle himself to custody on account of his conduct
    in the light of the facts and the circumstances of each case. In the
    instant case, the evidence on the record showed that the
    respondent father who sought custody of the minor, neglected the
    child since the separation of the spouses inter se and had
    voluntarily left the custody to the petitioner-mother. She had
    brought him up and educated him till she had to opt for her
    second marriage. Even then she had not been negligent in the
    tare of her minor son. She had entrusted that duty to her mother
    and father and minor is being properly educated till date in a
    local school. All along this entire period, the father never bothered
    even to go to meet the minor much less than providing
    maintenance to him, when the petitioner-mother sued him for
    providing maintenance allowance to the minor. It is only then
    that he had made an application for custody of the minor. Again
    the respondent-father has also taken another wife who has got
    one or two children out of the wedlock. The second wife of the
    respondent is living in the village of the respondent whereas the
    respondent himself is an Army Personnel in service of Pakistan
    Army and remains under posting from one cantonment to
    another. Consequently, he would also not be present in the house
    where he proposed to lodge his son. The minor would be exposed
    to the onslaughts of the step-motherly treatment of his second
    wife. There would be no one to stop the step-mother from the
    well-known step motherly treatment. It was in these
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 12
    circumstances that the learned Courts below had concurrently
    found as a fact that the welfare of the minor lay in leaving him to
    the custody of the real mother through her parents rather than
    giving him to the respondent who is himself away from his
    household which had been left to the charge of the step-mother.”
    [Emphasis added]
  8. In the event of remarriage of either or both parents, the
    Court must consider the surrounding circumstances of both parties,
    including their educational qualifications, financial status, character,
    and ability to care for the minor. Due weight is also given to the
    emotional attachment of the minor. In Sardar Hussain and others v. Mst.
    Parveen Umer (PLD 2004 SC 357), custody was awarded to the mother
    despite her second marriage, as the minor had developed a strong
    emotional bond with her and regarded the father as a stranger, despite a
    short period of residence with him.
  9. Perusal of the record reveals that the petitioner is residing in
    Greece and, merely two months after his marriage with respondent No.1,
    he returned to Greece while respondent No.1 stayed in Pakistan. The
    petitioner pronounced divorce upon respondent No.1 while residing in
    Greece. Furthermore, the petitioner has neither seen his minor daughter
    since her birth nor made any effort to meet her. He did not return to
    Pakistan to pursue the custody of the minor but, instead, filed an
    application for custody after his arrival in Pakistan due to the demise of
    his father.
  10. The petition and subsequent appeal were filed through his
    attorney, Ihsanullah, his real brother, who represented him in the
    proceedings. This fact has been admitted by the Ihsanullah (attorney of
    petitioner) (A.W.1) before trial court in his cross examination wherein he
    stated that:
    “یہ درست ہے کہ جب سے نابالغہ پیدا ہوئی ہے، سائل اسجد نے نابالغہ کو نہیں دیکها ہے۔”
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 13
    Moreover, the petitioner did not appear personally in either the trial or
    appellate court or in constitutional petition.
  11. This clearly demonstrates that the petitioner’s application for
    custody is not motivated by affection or concern for the minor, but
    appears instead to be a retaliatory measure in response to the suit
    instituted by Respondent No.1 for recovery of dowry articles and
    maintenance. Moreover, there is no evidence on record to suggest that
    respondent No.1, the mother, has failed in her duty to properly care for
    the minor or to provide her with proper education and upbringing.
  12. It is evident that the minor is now about 13 years of age. She
    has never seen her father, who has been residing outside Pakistan since
    before her birth. Throughout her life, she has developed a strong
    emotional attachment with her mother, who has been her sole source of
    love, care, guidance, and financial support. On the contrary, the
    petitioner, as the father, has never made any attempt to contribute
    towards the minor’s educational expenses, nor has he inquired about her
    schooling or well-being.
  13. It is also an admitted fact that the minor is receiving quality
    education in a reputable private school and has consistently been
    securing top positions in her class, which reflects her academic
    excellence, proper upbringing, and stable environment. At this delicate
    and formative stage of adolescence, when emotional security, proper
    moral upbringing, and a strong educational foundation are of paramount
    importance for the minor’s future growth and development, any
    unwarranted disturbance or change in her environment would likely
    cause irreversible harm to her personality and career. Therefore, keeping
    in view the welfare, betterment, and best interests of the minor, it is
    imperative that her custody remains with her mother.
    Civil Petition No. 3920 OF 2024 14
  14. In view of the above discussion, we find that impugned
    judgment is well-reasoned and the High Court has considered all the
    material aspects of the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed
    to point out any illegality or infirmity in the concurrent findings of the
    courts below.
  15. Consequently, this petition, being devoid of merit, is
    dismissed and leave refused.
  16. Above are the reasons for our short order of even date
    reproduced below:-
    “Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the
    record with his able assistance. The petitioner is also in
    attendance.
    For the reasons to be recorded separately, leave is refused and
    the petition is dismissed by majority of 2 to 1 (Musarrat Hilali, J.
    dissenting). However, if any application for visitation rights is
    filed, at any stage, before the concerned Guardian Court, the
    same shall be decided on its own merits in accordance with law.”
    JUDGE
    JUDGE
    Islamabad
    22.04.2025
    APPROVED FOR REPORTING
    Paras Zafar, LC/*
    JUDGE
    Civil Petition No.3920 of2024
    Musarrat Hilali, I.-While I differ with my learned colleagues in
    dismissing the petition in limine, I feel compelled to briefly state my
    reasons.
    The petitioner, being the biological father of the minor, seeks the custody
    of his minor daughter presently residing with her maternal grandmother.
    The mother, respondent No.1, had already remarried and is settled abroad
    whereas, the petitioner has not remarried.
    Given the sensitive nature of custody matters and the paramount
    importance of the welfare of the minor, I was inclined to form an opinion
    to issue notices to the respondents before forming any conclusive view. In
    my opinion, the assertions raised in the petition, though not determinative
    at this stage did merit issuance of notice, which in the instant case would
    have enabled a more comprehensive assessment of the matter. A father
    holds a position of vital importance in a child’s life, offering not only
    emotional stability but also social identity and support within our societal
    structure.
    Nonetheless, I could not agree with the dismissal of th- netition in the
    manner as decided by my learned colleagues.
    Judge

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